With the aim of providing a scientific methodology for studies of services, the value-creation model, which classifies service models in three classes on the basis of the relationships among service providers, was proposed in the 2000s. However, the model lacks formal criteria for classifying service models in scientific way. Therefore, in this study, we first consider the activity of service design as an activity of designing "service mechanism" in reference to mechanism design, which is an area in economics and game theory. Then, we develop formal criteria for the classification of the service mechanism based on the value-creation model.
Introduction
Since most of service studies depend heavily on individual research subject and contain a humane element, there is great difficulty in understanding the structure and complexity of the service and constructing a methodology for the service design.
The value-creation models proposed by Ueda et al. [1, 2] describe the design problem of service as a co-creation decision-making problem that creates an effective solution through mutual interaction among varieties of agents, such as provider (producer), receiver (consumer), environment, and services (products). Depending on the nature of the mutual interaction, the models were classified into three models, Providing Value Model, Adaptive Value Model, and Cocreative Value Model. In the process of the development of this model, Ueda thought that it is essential to consider service not only as an engineering subject but as a scientific subject. However, formal criteria for classifying service models in scientific way have not been given yet.
Therefore, in this study, we first discuss the possibility of considering the activity of service design as an activity of designing "service mechanism" by applying the formal framework of mechanism design, which is a mathematical theory in economics and game theory. Then, we develop a formal criterion for the classification of the service mechanism based on the value-creation model.
Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is concerned with rule settings where a social designer faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple players into a collective decision when the players exhibit strategic behavior [3] . Each player's objective is to maximize expected value of his/her own payoff measured in some utility scale. Mechanism design can be viewed as reverse engineering of games or equivalently as the art of designing the rules of a game to achieve a specific desired outcome. In this view, the goals of the designer are to design institutions or rules that meet social or designer's own objective. Modeling the problem of service design in the framework of mechanism design is to formulate the design problem of service whether the result of the interaction between varieties of players -provider, receiver and environment -achieves a social or designer's own objective in the designed rule settings.
In this study, we examine how we can formulate the problem of services mechanism using a formal framework of mechanism design. Here, we start by explaining the formal setting of mechanisms called indirect mechanisms [4] . A formal description of the elements of indirect mechanism is provided below. Definition 1.
(a) A set of finite number of players (e.g., a set of consumers or bidders at auction).
(b) Players' type spaces , where the parameter is referred to as player 's type, and generally contains the preference information on a set of outcomes shown blow.
(c) Players' action spaces . This is a collection of possible actions that can take (e.g., who to vote or how much to bid).
(d) A set of outcomes (e.g., a winner of the election or a result of an auction).
(e) Players' valuation functions , where player evaluate the "value" of outcome by referring privately to his/her own type and assigns to it.
(f) An outcome function .
(g) Players' payment functions , where in the payment is the action which takes.
(h) Player 's strategy function , where player have private information about type and he/she chose an action from his/her action spaces based on the private information.
(i) Player 's utility function , where is the utility achieved by player , when his/her type is and the profile of actions taken by all players . Using the notions above, the definition of indirect mechanisms is given as followings. Definition 2. Let outcome function player 's utility function , and . Then indirect mechanisms is defined by , where . In the above settings, the designer faces a problem called preference aggregation problem, i.e., 'for a given players' type spaces profile , which outcome should be chosen? '[3] To deal with the preference aggregation problem, mechanism design attempts implementing desired social choices function in a strategic setting.
Definition 3. Function is called a social choice function.
Designer tries to aggregate the different preferences of players toward desired single joint decision . To illustrate how mechanism design works, we show a famous example of indirect mechanism: Vickrey's second price auction.
Vickrey's Second Price Auction
In a Vickrey's second price auction, bidders are asked to submit sealed bids [4] .
An auctioneer wants to sell a good among bidders. Each player has a private information about the value of the good, that is, he/she is "willing to pay" for it. The bidder decides the amount by referring privately to his/her actual type . If wins the good, but has to pay some price , then 's utility is . If someone else wins the good, then 's utility is . The bids are opened by the auctioneer and the bidder with the highest bid gets the good and pays to the auctioneer an amount equal to the second highest bid. The other bidders pay nothing.
In this auction, mechanism the auctioneer employs is an indirect mechanism , where is 's bid, is outcome function given by where . The functions is known as winner determination rules and the function is payment function.
Let be the th highest bid in and be the th highest bid in , then the winner determination rule and the payment function will be as followings.
(1) If we assume that any two bidders do not bid the same bid value in the auction, the following proposition holds . When bids , wins and pays , thus 's utility is . Note that even the bidders try to maximize their own benefit by referring their private information, the outcome achieves the social welfare.
